Praises
Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Terrorism
The end of the Cold War brought about an initial euphoria that the threat of nuclear annihilation had dissipated and dramatic changes in the deterrence postures of the major powers could be enacted. Time, though, has shown that prevailing doctrines of nuclear deterrence are essentially unchanged between the major powers. The change that has created a need for further development of nuclear deterrence doctrine in the last fifteen years, however, is the appearance of nations with small nuclear forces (SNF) and non-state actors pursuing nuclear capability.
From the start of the 20th Century to the beginning of WWII, deterrence relied upon conventional arms races and preventive war. The German pre-WWI posture serves as an excellent example. The Germans relied on starting a preventive war against Russia and France to prevent being attacked itself. The Germans could see they were gradually being eclipsed by French and Russian military power and believed war was inevitable, so Germany chose to fight while they were still relatively strong. Similar thinking is documented in Germany and Japan at the start of the Second World War.
Later, following the advent of atomic weapons, theories of nuclear deterrence arose. Of these theories, there were two major schools of thought: 1) deterrence by punishment – retaliation against population centers in the event of an attack, and 2) deterrence by denial – successful first strike against an opponent’s arsenal. The U.S. and Russia pursued both strategies at one time and another. A third theory, existential deterrence, emerged following the Cuban missile crisis and argued it was the fear of nuclear war that made deterrence work and resulted in a “tradition of non-use.” These theories worked well to prevent nuclear conflict and direct confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., but as McGeorge Bundy pointed out in The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy, this nuclear stalemate did little to prevent any of the large number of proxy wars between the two superpowers.
As stated before, it seems little has changed in the postures of the major nuclear powers, despite the end of the Cold War and emerging American nuclear primacy. Surely, the U.S. and Russia have dramatically cut their stockpiles since the end of the Cold War and have removed tactical nuclear weapons from forward bases and deployed ships and submarines, but both nations maintain strategic missile submarines (as do the Chinese, French and British), the U.S. and Russia still maintain large stockpiles, and strategic forces remain on high alert. In addition, the U.S. is also pursuing a long term program for anti-ballistic missile defense. Finally, ongoing unilateral disarmament efforts by the U.S. and Russia have not deterred nations like India, Pakistan, N. Korea and Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons, and China from expanding its strategic forces.
Going forward into the 21st Century, however, a number of changes in the balance of nuclear power have resulted in doubts about the utility of current doctrines of nuclear deterrence. Today there are three major challenges to future nuclear deterrence: 1) the small nuclear forces of new atomic states, 2) anti-state or non-state actors, and 3) return of preventive war as an acceptable deterrence doctrine.
In the case of nations possessing small nuclear forces (SNF), like Pakistan and India, the applicability of traditional theories of deterrence are shaky at best. Deterrence by denial by a SNF is useless against opponents with LNF, and against other SNF powers the applicability depends upon many other factors, like intelligence, delivery and early warning systems. Deterrence by punishment, again, may be effective against other SNF states, but against LNF states it has minimal value. And existential deterrence’s effectiveness depends heavily on the cultural and religious values of the SNF state, and might be impossible to quantify.
The dangers posed by antistate actors in the nuclear balance of power are even more troubling. Deterrence is based on reason, and while states are generally “rational actors”, terrorist organizations (essentially “anti-state” actors) are often “irrational actors.” States have stable political and military systems and organizations, with checks and balances, populations, territory and resources to protect, and have a vested interest in being rational and predictable. Anti-state actors, however, have none of these elements, usually possess radical political or religious ideologies, and often take pride in their unpredictability and willingness to escalate conflicts.
Complicating this is the fact that anti-state actors also work to destabilize the very systems and organizations that make state actors rational. In The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Clash Between State and Antistate Actors, Mohan Malik concludes that South Asia is particularly vulnerable to the influence of anti-state actors, as the nations in the region have yet to fully develop the checks and balances in their political systems and mature, redundant controls over their arsenals.
There appears to be some progress with respect to the SNF problems. India has made gains in stabilizing and securing their arsenal to address the dangers of SNF and anti-state actors as an example to other new nuclear powers. First, India has adopted a strict policy of no first use. Second, India asserts that it will not resort to nukes against non-nuclear and non-aligned states. India’s current doctrine is focused on denial by punishment, and they are pursuing a triad of air, land and sea based systems to ensure second strike capability. Third, India has enforced strict civilian control by democratically elected leaders through a survivable command and control system, and their arsenal is protected by adequate security and safety systems to prevent unauthorized use. And fourth, though India will not accept limitations on its maintenance, testing and R&D, its stated goal is to continue to emphasize and pursue global nuclear disarmament.
Where no progress has been made is with regard to the irrational state and anti-state actors. The Bush Administration’s doctrine of preemptive war was intended as a step towards addressing the new security threats, but there are many dangers inherent in this approach. With the invasion of Iraq the Global War on Terror became as much a war of counterproliferation as a war on terrorism.
In the past nonproliferation and counterproliferation entailed diplomacy, sanctions, deterrence, defenses and the capacity to strike at another nation’s nuclear arsenal, command and control and delivery systems. This shift is a tacit acknowledgement that the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not guarantee a nation will not develop or acquire nuclear arms. Deterrence now, at least for the time being, has broadened to include not just deterring a nuclear state from using their weapons, but also includes preventing non-nuclear states and non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons. And in the case of Iran, this approach appears to be failing. Indeed, the Bush Doctrine and preoccupation of America’s conventional military on conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may have actually had the opposite effect and accelerated development efforts by states that were already pursuing nuclear weapons.
All of which begs the question: where do America and nuclear deterrence go from here? The current global security situation has been and will continue to be a challenge to large and small powers alike. Major powers are confronted with threats that their vast arsenals appear useless to deter, and are reverting to risky, offensive doctrines of the past. In response, small powers and anti-state actors are deciding to pursue nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in attempts to deter a major power they believe is an irrational, uncontrollable threat.
So, with the vexing problem of anti-state actors rendering deterrence by denial and existential deterrence dead letters, deterrence by punishment seems to be the only remaining option for America. This would entail warning the most likely cooperative sources of a terrorist bomb or bomb technology - Iran, Pakistan and North Korea – that if an unexplained nuclear detonation takes place on the territory of the United States, Tehran, Islamabad and Pyongyang would pay a heavy price. Ten years ago this kind of policy would have been unthinkable, but the brave new world of atomic proliferation seems to demand it.
Smash gets it, too.
From the start of the 20th Century to the beginning of WWII, deterrence relied upon conventional arms races and preventive war. The German pre-WWI posture serves as an excellent example. The Germans relied on starting a preventive war against Russia and France to prevent being attacked itself. The Germans could see they were gradually being eclipsed by French and Russian military power and believed war was inevitable, so Germany chose to fight while they were still relatively strong. Similar thinking is documented in Germany and Japan at the start of the Second World War.
Later, following the advent of atomic weapons, theories of nuclear deterrence arose. Of these theories, there were two major schools of thought: 1) deterrence by punishment – retaliation against population centers in the event of an attack, and 2) deterrence by denial – successful first strike against an opponent’s arsenal. The U.S. and Russia pursued both strategies at one time and another. A third theory, existential deterrence, emerged following the Cuban missile crisis and argued it was the fear of nuclear war that made deterrence work and resulted in a “tradition of non-use.” These theories worked well to prevent nuclear conflict and direct confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., but as McGeorge Bundy pointed out in The Unimpressive Record of Atomic Diplomacy, this nuclear stalemate did little to prevent any of the large number of proxy wars between the two superpowers.
As stated before, it seems little has changed in the postures of the major nuclear powers, despite the end of the Cold War and emerging American nuclear primacy. Surely, the U.S. and Russia have dramatically cut their stockpiles since the end of the Cold War and have removed tactical nuclear weapons from forward bases and deployed ships and submarines, but both nations maintain strategic missile submarines (as do the Chinese, French and British), the U.S. and Russia still maintain large stockpiles, and strategic forces remain on high alert. In addition, the U.S. is also pursuing a long term program for anti-ballistic missile defense. Finally, ongoing unilateral disarmament efforts by the U.S. and Russia have not deterred nations like India, Pakistan, N. Korea and Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons, and China from expanding its strategic forces.
Going forward into the 21st Century, however, a number of changes in the balance of nuclear power have resulted in doubts about the utility of current doctrines of nuclear deterrence. Today there are three major challenges to future nuclear deterrence: 1) the small nuclear forces of new atomic states, 2) anti-state or non-state actors, and 3) return of preventive war as an acceptable deterrence doctrine.
In the case of nations possessing small nuclear forces (SNF), like Pakistan and India, the applicability of traditional theories of deterrence are shaky at best. Deterrence by denial by a SNF is useless against opponents with LNF, and against other SNF powers the applicability depends upon many other factors, like intelligence, delivery and early warning systems. Deterrence by punishment, again, may be effective against other SNF states, but against LNF states it has minimal value. And existential deterrence’s effectiveness depends heavily on the cultural and religious values of the SNF state, and might be impossible to quantify.
The dangers posed by antistate actors in the nuclear balance of power are even more troubling. Deterrence is based on reason, and while states are generally “rational actors”, terrorist organizations (essentially “anti-state” actors) are often “irrational actors.” States have stable political and military systems and organizations, with checks and balances, populations, territory and resources to protect, and have a vested interest in being rational and predictable. Anti-state actors, however, have none of these elements, usually possess radical political or religious ideologies, and often take pride in their unpredictability and willingness to escalate conflicts.
Complicating this is the fact that anti-state actors also work to destabilize the very systems and organizations that make state actors rational. In The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Clash Between State and Antistate Actors, Mohan Malik concludes that South Asia is particularly vulnerable to the influence of anti-state actors, as the nations in the region have yet to fully develop the checks and balances in their political systems and mature, redundant controls over their arsenals.
There appears to be some progress with respect to the SNF problems. India has made gains in stabilizing and securing their arsenal to address the dangers of SNF and anti-state actors as an example to other new nuclear powers. First, India has adopted a strict policy of no first use. Second, India asserts that it will not resort to nukes against non-nuclear and non-aligned states. India’s current doctrine is focused on denial by punishment, and they are pursuing a triad of air, land and sea based systems to ensure second strike capability. Third, India has enforced strict civilian control by democratically elected leaders through a survivable command and control system, and their arsenal is protected by adequate security and safety systems to prevent unauthorized use. And fourth, though India will not accept limitations on its maintenance, testing and R&D, its stated goal is to continue to emphasize and pursue global nuclear disarmament.
Where no progress has been made is with regard to the irrational state and anti-state actors. The Bush Administration’s doctrine of preemptive war was intended as a step towards addressing the new security threats, but there are many dangers inherent in this approach. With the invasion of Iraq the Global War on Terror became as much a war of counterproliferation as a war on terrorism.
In the past nonproliferation and counterproliferation entailed diplomacy, sanctions, deterrence, defenses and the capacity to strike at another nation’s nuclear arsenal, command and control and delivery systems. This shift is a tacit acknowledgement that the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not guarantee a nation will not develop or acquire nuclear arms. Deterrence now, at least for the time being, has broadened to include not just deterring a nuclear state from using their weapons, but also includes preventing non-nuclear states and non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons. And in the case of Iran, this approach appears to be failing. Indeed, the Bush Doctrine and preoccupation of America’s conventional military on conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may have actually had the opposite effect and accelerated development efforts by states that were already pursuing nuclear weapons.
All of which begs the question: where do America and nuclear deterrence go from here? The current global security situation has been and will continue to be a challenge to large and small powers alike. Major powers are confronted with threats that their vast arsenals appear useless to deter, and are reverting to risky, offensive doctrines of the past. In response, small powers and anti-state actors are deciding to pursue nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in attempts to deter a major power they believe is an irrational, uncontrollable threat.
So, with the vexing problem of anti-state actors rendering deterrence by denial and existential deterrence dead letters, deterrence by punishment seems to be the only remaining option for America. This would entail warning the most likely cooperative sources of a terrorist bomb or bomb technology - Iran, Pakistan and North Korea – that if an unexplained nuclear detonation takes place on the territory of the United States, Tehran, Islamabad and Pyongyang would pay a heavy price. Ten years ago this kind of policy would have been unthinkable, but the brave new world of atomic proliferation seems to demand it.
Smash gets it, too.
posted by Unknown | 13:30 |
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